Abstract
Introduction
While the modelling framework offered by networks is a straight-forward and intuitive 23 one, it is often limited to individual-based stochastic simulations that can be difficult to this requires a mathematical handle on both solutions as well as the formulation of an ap- 31 propriate limit in which the exact-stochastic model approaches the deterministic limit. One 32 such well known class of approximate models is that of the pairwise models (e.g., Matsuda and Keeling, 2011) where the dynamics at the node level, in a population with network-like 35 contact structure, is described in terms of the dynamics of pairs of individuals and where the 36 hierarchical dependence on higher order structures is cut off via an appropriately constructed 37 closure. In recent years, other models of similar nature have been derived, for example, the 38 Probability Generating Function approach (Volz and Meyers, 2007; Volz, 2008 ) and more 39 notably the Effective Degree model (Lindquist et al., 2011) . These models have arisen in the 40 context of epidemiology but their formulation and properties makes them amenable to be 41 used for the modelling of evolutionary game dynamics on networks.
42
In this paper, we consider the evolutionary dynamics of individuals interacting on differ- population, an individual dies with probability inversely proportional to its fitness, and thus 85 fitter individuals are more likely to survive, and is replaced by the offspring of a randomly 86 chosen neighbour. During the evolutionary process it is assumed that there is no mutation, 87 just selection, i.e., the offspring of each individual is a perfect copy of its parent. Voter model 88 type dynamics is one of the classical interacting particle systems which has been applied to 
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It is noted that since the above process is a stochastic process and the transition probabilities 93 from one state to another are inversely proportional to fitness, the fitness of each individual 94 has to be strictly positive. This is assumed throughout the paper.
95
We show that for randomly or proportionately mixed networks, with or without degree 
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Since all the vertices of the graph are assumed to be topologically equivalent, every pair 127 of A (B) individuals is equally likely to be connected with probability q A|A (q B|B ). Thus, the 128 probability that from the k connections of an A individual, i of them are with other As (and 129 thus k − i are with Bs), l A (i), is assumed to follow a binomial distribution and is given by
Similarly, the probability that a B individual is connected with i As and k − i Bs is assumed to be given by
An A individual which is connected with i other A individuals has fitness equal to
Let us denote by F the sum of the inverse of the fitnesses of all individuals.
The probability that an A individual dies (inversely proportional to its fitness) and is replaced 136 by a (randomly selected) neighbouring B individual, P A→B , is given by
One of the B individuals dies with probability inversely proportional to its fitness and is
138
replaced by a random neighbouring A individual with probability
The rate of increase of the frequency of A individuals, p A , (given one transition in each iteration step) is given by the following equatioṅ
(kN/2 is the total number of links). This happens with probability
Similarly, the number of AA pairs increases by i and therefore p AA increases by i/(kN/2) 143 due to the replacement of a B connected to i As by an A with probability
According to the above, the rate of increase of the frequency of AA pairs (given one transition in each iteration step) is given by the following equatioṅ
Since, 
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The sum of the inverse of the fitnesses of all individuals, F , is given by
where we have set α = f b + wa, β = f b + wb, γ = f b + wc and δ = f b + wd. Let us also define some terms which will be useful in subsequent calculations. Let L xy be the number of links which connect an individual of type x to an individual of type y (with x and y being the start and destination node, respectively), where x and y denotes either a mutant (M) or a resident (R) individual.
In addition, we use the following notations:
where δ ij mr is a function defined as
An individual might move from one class to another, either by a change of its strategy or due 175 to the change of a neighbour's strategy. The probability that an A mutant individual of the 176 M m,r class is replaced by a B resident individual and move to the R m,r class is equal to the 177 probability that this individual is selected for death (with probability inversely proportional 178 to its fitness) and is replaced by the offspring of one of its neighbouring residents (which is 179 chosen at random), i.e. this probability is equal to
Similarly, a node of the R m,r class moves to the M m,r class with probability
A mutant connected to m other mutants and r residents leaves the M m,r class and enters 182 the M m+1,r−1 class when a neighbouring resident is replaced by a mutant. The probability 183 that a resident individual from an R i,j class is selected to die and is replaced by an offspring 184 of a mutant neighbour is equal to
We now use an approximation to estimate the probability that the replaced resident is 186 connected to a mutant from the M m,r class. This is assumed to be equal to the probability 187 that a randomly chosen link which connects a resident individual with a mutant (starts from ways of making such a connection). This probability is given by
Hence, the probability that a mutant from the M m,r class moves to the M m+1,r−1 class can 193 be approximated by
In the same way, the probability that a mutant individual from the M m,r class moves to 195 the M m−1,r+1 class is equal to the probability that a neighbouring mutant of that individual 196 is replaced by a resident. The probability of such a transition is approximated by the probability that a mutant of the population dies, is replaced by a neighbouring resident and 198 the replaced mutant is connected to the mutant from the M m,r class, i.e. by the probability
The term M i,j − δ while the probability of leaving the R m,r class and moving to the R m−1,r+1 class is given by
The transition probabilities of moving from and to the M m,r and R m,r classes are represented 215 schematically in the diagram in Fig. 1 
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The dynamics of the D max (D max + 3) different classes of the population is described by the following differential equation based compartmental model
for {(m, r) :
The density of mutants A in the population is given by p A = be bounded below by 1, which is the minimum natural value that these terms can take. 
Numerical examples and comparisons with stochastic simulations
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In this section, we examine the effectiveness of the two approximation models described in average payoff equal to V /2. This game is described by the following payoff matrix
In this game, if the value of the resource outweighs the cost of the fight, i.e. if a > c ⇒ V > C, achieved at a significantly earlier time).
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The numerical examples shown in Fig. 2 indicate that, on the three type of networks an approximation with improved accuracy compared to the solution of the pairwise model.
289
Although it is observed that contact structure has little effect on such evolutionary dynamics, 
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Although the novelty of this paper is the introduction of this powerful approximation 296 method for the approximation of the evolutionary game dynamics in structured populations,
297
we discuss some main conclusions about the effect of the population structure on the out- 
